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Abstract—In this paper we identify and define Zenith attacks,
a new class of attacks on content-distribution systems, which
seek to expose the popularity (i.e. access frequency) of individual
items of content. As the access pattern to most real-world content
exhibits Zipf-like characteristics [2], there is a small set of
dominating items which account for the majority of accesses.
Identifying such items enables an adversary to perform follow
up adversarial actions targeting these items, including mounting
denial of service attacks, deploying censorship mechanisms, and
eavesdropping on or prosecution of the host or recipient. We
instantiate a Zenith attack on the Kademlia and Chord structured
overlay networks and quantify the cost of such an attack. As a
countermeasure to these attacks we propose Crypsis, a system to
conceal the lookup frequency of individual keys through aggre-
gation over ranges of the keyspace. Crypsis provides provable
security guarentees for concealment of lookup frequency while
maintaining logarithmic routing and state bounds.
I. INTRODUCTION
Peer-to-peer systems have emerged as one of the most
popular methods for distributing content over the Internet,
from largely static movies, music, and software to cached web
objects and multicast streams. Due to the global reach of such
systems and their lack of central accountability, peer-to-peer
networks are useful venues for the publishing and distribution
of sensitive material which may be censored, classified, or
banned under certain nations’ laws. To this end, a significant
number of networks and protocols have been proposed (and
implemented) to provide some level of anonymity to users. Tor
[6] is a well-known example, which relies on onion routing and
plausible deniability to conceal the source of traffic originating
in its network.
Structured overlay networks in particular have gained pop-
ularity in recent years and are deployed in a wide variety of
settings, including the trackerless torrent system in Bittorrent
[8], the Coral CDN [9], Freenet [4], OpenDHT [22], and
Dynamo [11]. Often used as distributed hash tables (DHTs)
to index content, these networks provide logarithmic bounds
on routing and network state, as well as resilience to high
levels of churn and transient node failures. There are a number
of anonymizing protocols for structured overlays([19], [27],
[17], [20], [28], [24], [10]), which generally provide some
combination of origin anonymity and destination k-anonymity.
Content Popularity We argue that origin and destination
anonymity are not enough. Anonymity protocols address threat
models in which an adversary is seeking to discover the
identity of network participants. Consider, however, the case
where users are ignored entirely and an adversary directly
targets the content that they are accessing with denial of
service attacks. Or the case in which anonymity protocols fail
(either due to a strong adversary or improper implementation)
and identities are exposed. In these cases the popularity of
content may become critical information; the impact of denial
of service attacks can be maximized and the extent of a
censored document’s distribution (and perhaps the resulting
punishment to the leaker) can be gauged. Furthermore, if
popularity can be measured over time, access frequency could
potentially be correlated with external information to partially
identify users despite the presence of anonymizing protocols.
Peak access frequencies may, for example, fall within a few
probable time zones, hinting at geographic or national interest
in a particular item of content.
Zenith Attacks A second line of defense is needed. Content
popularity must itself be obfuscated in order to mitigate the
damage described above. We call attacks that reveal content
popularity Zenith attacks, and describe them in more detail
below. To demonstrate their practicality we instantiate a Zenith
attack on the popular Chord and Kademlia structured overlay
protocols. Furthermore, we show that the resources (quantified
in the number of adversarial nodes) required to mount even
the most naive Zenith attacks are extremely low, and well
within the capabilities of almost any real-world attacker. This
is largely due to the deterministic routing which characterizes
structured overlays; given the distance between two nodes, it
is trivial to calculate the expected proportion of traffic destined
for one node that will be seen by the other.
Crypsis Motivated by the ease with which an adversary
can determine popular content, we propose Crypsis: a system
which conceals individual key lookup frequencies in structured
overlay networks by aggregating all lookups over a segment
of the total keyspace. Crypsis completely divides the keyspace
into a number of nonoverlapping segments and uses standard
iterative lookups to contact a randomly chosen node in the
segment hosting a desired key. Within that segment a separate
query protocol locates the key itself, without revealing infor-
mation on the key being looked up to any nodes but the host
for that key. We define and prove Crypsis’ security properties
in the presence of a weak global adversary, and show that
it maintains (within a small constant factor) the logarithmic
routing and state bounds of the original structured overlay on
which it is built.
Organization The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. Section II describes the Zenith attack, and presents ex-
perimental results on the vulnerability of Chord and Kademlia
to naive versions of the attack. Section III describes our threat
model in detail. Section IV describes Crypsis’ architecture and
analyzes its security properties. Section V discusses what an
adversary can conclude from information that Crypsis does not
conceal. Section VI discusses related work. Finally, Section
VII presents our conclusions and future work.
II. THE ZENITH ATTACK
We define Zenith attacks as a general class of attacks
against content distribution systems which exploit routing and
lookup information to reveal content popularity. The specific
mechanisms that a Zenith attack employs are dependent on the
target system. For example, in unstructured overlay networks
like Gnutella an attack may be mounted by monitoring flooded
searches or queries throughout the network, or by monitoring
the cache lifetime and replication rate of content on adversarial
nodes over time. In this paper, however, we focus on an in-
stance of the Zenith attack against structured overlay networks.
These overlays are one of the most likely victims of such an
attack, as they often form the backbone of the distribution
systems of choice for content which needs to be distributed
anonymously and/or discreetly (e.g. Freenet, Nisan, Bittorrent,
I2P, etc.)
The Naive Attack Zenith attacks on structured overlays
exploit the fact that routing is key-based, and that keys have a
one-to-one mapping with items of content. To mount a Zenith
attack, we assume an adversary adds nodes to the network at
some fixed cost. As functioning peers, these nodes will serve
as intermediary routers for some proportion of the messages
that are routed through the system. The adversary maintains a
frequency count for each request for an item of content (i.e.
key) that its sees. Once the adversary judges that enough data
has been collected, the most popular items are identified by
comparison of frequency counts. We refer to this process as a
naive Zenith attack.
Exploiting Structure More advanced attacks may take
advantage of network structure in order to exploit topology-
related effects and improve the accuracy of results. Since
structured overlay networks route over a keyspace using a
distance metric, the proportion of lookups for a specific key
which pass through a particular node is quantifiable. Below,
we provide an example using Chord which allows an adversary
to create a scaling vector with which to augment its frequency
count. More accurate techniques utilizing, e.g., noise reduction
and signal analysis are certainly possible, but experimental
results (see Section II-B) indicate little need for anything
beyond the naive attack.
Attack Amplification As a final note, Zenith attacks can be
further augmented by attacks which concentrate the amount
of traffic passing through adversarial nodes. Sybil attacks [7],
in which a single adversary cheaply instantiates an extremely
large number of nodes, are particularly effective. Since node
IDs are assigned via collision-resistant hash algorithms, there
is a very high probability that Sybil nodes will be distributed
over the entire keyspace. As a result, many paths will intersect
with at least one of the adversary’s nodes. The Eclipse attack
[3], is also useful to amplify Zenith attacks. This technique
uses a set of colluding adversarial nodes to manipulate the
routing tables of honest nodes to ensure that adversarial nodes
are intermediate routers for a large portion of network traffic.
The exact mechanism is somewhat protocol dependent, but
generally relies on corrupting the neighbour-selection algo-
rithm used by honest peers.
A. Chord Zenith Attack
As a proof of concept, we present a Zenith attack against
a Chord network [25] which leverages its distance metric to
increase the accuracy of scaling results. Chord places nodes in
arithmetic order on a ring with 2m distinct positions, each of
which is identified by an m-bit hash of their IP address, public
key, etc. Each node is responsible for content which hashes
to the range between its identifier and that of its immediate
predecessor. In order to facilitate fast lookups, each node n
maintains a routing table of entries that point to the successor
node of a key equal to n + 2i−1, where i is the ith entry in
the table. Messages originating at n or passing through n will
be sent to the successor node of the routing table entry closest
to, but not exceeding, the destination key.
Exploiting Distance Note that messages are always routed
via the longest possible hop, and that distances are asymmetric.
From this we can conclude that a node i (where i is the
network identifier) will see a portion of queries for a key k





An adversary can then add nodes to a Chord network
and record frequency counts as usual. Before aggregating the
measurements, however, each key in each count can be scaled
by the distance between the measuring node and the key. This
will allow a closer approximation of the actual key popularity.
B. Vulnerability Assessment
Of the many structured overlay networks in use today, Chord
[25] and Kademlia [16] (or variants thereof) are two of the
more widely deployed. Chord is used in the CFS distributed
storage system [5], and Kademlia variants are used by both
the Gnutella network and Bittorrent.
Setup We simulated Chord and Kademlia over a 1000 node
network in order to assess the practicality and efficacy of
Zenith attacks. All of our experiments use a trace-driven
dataset with a power-law distribution derived from the 2009
Blogspot memetracker dataset [15], of which there are 56888
unique items. As indiciated by the work cited in section ??,
content popularity in many real-world settings follows a power
law. We chose to use a dataset which tracks quote activation
on blogs, as this easily generalizes to the case in which users
(blogs) express interest in a particular piece of information
(quote).
An adversary controlling a fraction of randomly selected
nodes attempts to identify the top 10 items. We chose to use
the most naive Zenith attack: the adversary merely maintains
a count of lookups that is seen for each key, and outputs the
10 highest-count keys at the end of the simulation. Results for
are shown in Figure 1. Each datapoint represents fifty trials.
Fig. 1. Key Popularity in Chord and Kademlia
Results Note in Figure 1 that for Chord, approximately
90%, and for Kademlia approximately 80%, of the most 10
popular keys are recovered with 10 nodes under adversarial
control. This suggests that popularity-revealing attacks are
both practical and cheap to mount. Furthermore, the adversary
for these experiments was confined to a naive attack. By ex-
ploiting the deterministic properties of DHTs (e.g. key distance
metrics), a significant amount of noise could be removed from
lookup frequency counts and even fewer adversarial nodes
would be necessary. Since both Chord and Kademlia are
deployed extensively in the wild, these experiments motivate
the development of a popularity-concealing structured overlay
network.
III. THREAT MODEL
Given a structured overlay network with |N | nodes and |K|
m-bit keys, we define the following terms:
• N - The set of all nodes in the network.
• N ′ - The set of nodes controlled by the adversary. Note
that N ′ ⊂ N .
• K - The set of all possible keys. Note that |K| = 2m.
• P - The secret vector of key lookup probabilities for all
keys k ∈ K. These probabilities can be thought of as
being derived from key lookup frequency counts over a
unit of time.
• L = {k|Pk > γ} - The set of most popular keys for some
threshold of lookup probability, γ.
Adversarial Powers We assume that the adversary, A, is
a passive global observer able to see all messages sent over
the network. We further add the power to control a subset of
nodes N ′. These nodes are assumed to be colluding, and may
deviate from the protocol if they choose. The adversary may
add new nodes to N ′ at a fixed, per-node cost. They may not,
however, choose where new nodes are placed (i.e. choose the
network identifier for new nodes), since structured overlays
use a cryptographic hash of IP address or public key to assign
identifiers.
Adversarial Objectives The adversary is further assumed to
possess a prior probability distribution P ′ over all keys k ∈ K
and a distance function f(X,Y ) such that f(X,Y ) = 0 ↔
X = Y , where X and Y are random variables. We define
f loosely in order to allow the adversary to choose the most
beneficial distance metric for its purposes. The adversary will
attempt to form a posterior probability distribution P̂ such
that:
1) Given the prior P ′k, f(P̂k, Pk) is minimized for an
adversarially chosen target key k.





In doing so, the cost function |N ′| should be minimized.
Estimating Key Popularity For the first objective the adver-
sary, depending on its identity and aims, may have one or more
keys which it is interested in and has some expectation about
their popularity (defined as lookup probability). A government
trying to assess the interest in the web address of a leaked
document that made headlines, for example, can reasonably
expect the key which identifies that address to be popular.
This expectation is made prior to joining the network. A’s
objective is to arrive (as cheaply as possible) at a modified
expected value for the key of interest, which is as close as
possible to the actual popularity of the key.
Finding Popular Keys For the second objective, A is
interested not in determining the popularity of a specific key,
but instead in attempting to identify which keys are the most
popular. An example would be a purely malicious attacker
interested simply in maximizing damage against the network
as a whole. Again, some prior expectation of a popular key
set is assumed to be present prior to joining the network.
If the network is often used to exchange media files, for
example, then hit songs, television shows, movies, etc. could
be expected to be present.
Adversarial Success Note that none of the above objectives
has a clear notion of success or failure. Rather, each objective
can be considered a best-effort attempt, with a success rate
proportional to the distance between A’s posterior distribution
and the actual distribution of key lookup probabilities, with
respect to some adversarially chosen distance function. Crypsis
does not claim to eliminate all information leakage which
could lead to adversarial success. It does, however, place
strong bounds on what information can be leaked. This topic
is addressed in more detail below.
IV. CRYPSIS
Crypsis is designed to address the above threat model via
a process of one-way aggregation (i.e. aggregation such that
disaggregation is intractable). Specifically, the protocol leaks
the sum of all lookup requests for a segment of the keyspace,
while concealing the lookup frequency of any individual key
in that segment from all observers except the single node
hosting that key. Intuitively, the popularity of an individual key
will have an upper bound equal to the aggregate popularity
of its keyspace segment. Similarly, trying to determine the
most popular keys will ultimately only allow the determination
of the most popular segments of the keyspace. Average-case
routing and state bounds are both O(log N); the constant
varies with respect to a system parameter, µ, described in
Section IV-A2.
A. Architecture
Crypsis is a two-tier system, similar in this respect to
Herbivore [10] and Agyaat [24]. The first tier is a global
structured overlay network, represented in Figure 3 as a
circular keyspace onto which nodes and items of content
are hashed. This layer provides connectivity and resolution
of coarse-grained lookups. The second tier consists of un-
structured complete mesh networks localized over contiguous
nonoverlapping regions of the keyspace, represented in Figure
3 as 3-cliques around the edge of the ring. This layer provides
popularity concealment and resolution of fine-grained lookups.
All members of the network are present in, and maintain
separate routing tables for, each tier.
Fig. 2. Crypsis Network
1) Global Overlay: This layer of the Crypsis network is a
standard structured overlay. While this paper assumes that the
overlay network is Chord-like [25], there is no reason that
a different topology (e.g. a Kademlia-like tree [16]) could
not be used instead. We merely require the presence of a
consistently hashed, closed keyspace. Nodes use this network
for two functions: joining the local mesh which their position
in the keyspace makes them a member of, and contacting the
remote mesh network containing a target key.
Node Joins When a new node joins a Crypsis network, it
bootstraps into the global overlay using that overlay’s joining
mechanism. Once an identifier is assigned to the node, it joins
the local mesh network responsible for the keyspace range con-
taining its identifier. Since keyspace ranges are nonoverlapping
and contiguous, bootstrap information can easily be obtained
from the node’s immediate successor or predecessor (or both)
in the global overlay. The only time this would not be true is
if the new node is the sole member of a local mesh, at which
point there is no need to obtain bootstrapping information.
Backbone Routing The global overlay is also used to
contact the remote mesh network responsible for a target key
in a simple two step process:
1) A querying node first computes the keyspace range
containing the target key. This is a deterministic com-
putation that can be performed locally, and is described
in Section IV-B.
2) The node then generates a random number in that range
and performs an iterative lookup for that number over
the global overlay. When the hosting node is found, it
provides the querying node with a copy of its local mesh
network routing table.
In this way, the global overlay essentially acts a backbone
connecting members of different mesh networks.
2) Mesh Networks: Mesh networks in Crypsis are cliques
of all nodes whose identifiers fall within a particular range.
Ranges do not overlap, and every node is a member of either
one or two meshes. 1 These networks are used to conceal
the actual target of a query. In essence, a query for any
key in a particular mesh network generates masking traffic
to all members of the network, such that the real query
is indistinguishable from a masking query. An observer can
determine only that the query was for some key in the range
assigned to that mesh. Section IV-B describes the protocol in
detail.
The Number of Meshes In order to preserve logarithmic
routing and state bounds, the number of mesh networks in
a Crypsis network, µ, must be a function of the network





1A node is a member of a single mesh so long as the range of keys it is
responsible for falls entirely within that segment of the keyspace. If its range
spans two segments, it will maintain two disjoint routing tables.
where η is an estimate of the network population. Obviously,
efficiently setting a system parameter based on an estimate
of a dynamically changing quantity is nontrivial. We provide
a more in-depth discussion of how to estimate the network
population and avoid frequent reconfigurations in Section V-A.
Tuning Concealment While Crypsis seeks to preserve the
beneficial properties of a structured overlay, µ can alterna-
tively be seen as a tuning parameter that trades routing and
state efficiency for security. Decoupling it from the network
population would create a fixed number of unstructured sub-
networks connected by a structured overlay backbone. As
the number of sub-networks decreases, the amount of keys
aggregated together increases, and less can be determined
about the overall shape of the key popularity distribution.
Simulations demonstrating this effect are presented in Section
IV-D.
3) Trusted Infrastructure: Like the vast majority of struc-
tured overlay security protocols, Crypsis requires the presence
of an offline Certificate Authority (CA). As we discuss in
Section IV-C, the CA is needed to prevent man-in-the-middle
attacks during key exchange.
Root Verification In addition to an offline CA, Crypsis
relies on the assumption that overlay nodes cannot lie about
which region of the keyspace they are responsible for. This
assumption does not hold in basic structured overlays like
Chord and Kademlia. Nodes in these networks can claim
responsibility for arbitrary regions of the key space, opening
the possibility for redirection, identity spoofing, and denial or
service attacks.
The Myrmic [26] root verification protocol is explicitly
designed to address this. Myrmic assumes the existence of an
offline Certificate Authority, as well as an online Neighbor-
hood Authority (NA). NAs assign keyspace regions to newly
joined overlay nodes and issue a signed certificate (witnessed
by the new node’s neighbors) attesting to the binding. Routing
is iterative, and a queried node must present its certificate to
the querying node at each hop.
While Crypsis only requires a generic root verification pro-
tocol, the authors are unaware of any other work comparable
to Myrmic. We therefore assume that Myrmic is deployed on
the global overlay network.
B. Query Protocol
The objective of Crypsis is to conceal key popularity by
aggregating all queries made to one segment of the keyspace.
As discussed above, the global structured overlay acts as
backbone connecting local unstructured cliques, each of which
is responsible for all keys in its segment. Our query protocol
first navigates the global overlay using a dummy key which is
in the same segment as the target key. Next, every node in the
mesh network responsible for the target key is queried over a
secure channel. The key’s host is asked for the key, while other
hosts are asked for a dummy key. Since Crypsis is designed
to conceal key popularity, we handle only two types of query:
• get(k) - Returns the item bound to key k.
• put(k, v) - Inserts the item identified by v into the
network, bound to key k.
The following protocol is invoked whenever either type of
query is launched for a target key, k, in the keyspace, by any
node, A, in the network:





where b is the number of bits in the keyspace.





3) A: Select k′ ∈R range(Sk)
4) A: Find the node, B, responsible for k′ using an
iterative DHT lookup. For security purposes, assume k′
is broadcast to all members of the network.
5) A → B: (RRT), where RRT is a message indicating a
request for the receiver’s local mesh routing table.
6) B → A: (RT), where RT is a routing table of all IP
addresses in Sk.
7) ∀n ∈ RT :
a) A ↔ n: Negotiate symmetric key S using an
authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
b) A→ n: (Range)S
c) n→ A: (rangeStart, rangeEnd)S
d) If rangeStart ≤ k ≤ rangeEnd:
i) A→ n: (k, v, get/put)S where v is the fixed-
length value associated with the specified key.
e) Else:
i) Select rangeStart ≤ k′′ ≤ rangeEnd uni-
formly at random.
ii) A→ n: (k′′, v, get)S
f) n→ A: (v)S
Consequences Note in the above protocol that all commu-
nication taking place between a querying node and a node
in a mesh network uses a secure channel over which a fixed
number of fixed-sized messages are exchanged regardless of
message content. While necessary to ensure that the target key
is masked, it has three important side-effects:
• In order to establish the secure channel (Step 7a), a public
key operation is required in order to prevent man-in-the-
middle attacks during key negotiation. This is the only
step which uses public-key encryption, it but does require
a PKI in order to ensure secure binding of public keys
and identities.
• Items in a Crypsis network are limited to a fixed maxi-
mum size. Anything less than this size must be padded,
and anything larger either truncated or split over multiple
keys.
• Message length remains constant regardless of query type
or success. This incurs a certain amount of wasted band-
width, but is necessary to effectively mask the genuine
query.
State Bounds Crypsis requires nodes to keep routing state
for both the global overlay and their local mesh network(s).
The amount of state required for the former is O(log n) by
definition, with specific constants varying by overlay choice.
The latter is at worst O(2m), where m is the size of the local
complete mesh network. Note, however, that since we have set
µ = ηlog η , it follows that m =
n
µ . Therefore m ∈ O(log n)
as long as η is within an order of magnitude of the network
population (achievable using algorithms described in [13] and
[14]) and nodes are distributed uniformly. Then the total state
required remains O(log n).
Routing Bounds Routing bounds are calculated similarly.
The number of hops from a querying node to the remote
mesh network responsible for a target key is O(log n) as it
iteratively traverses the global structured overlay. This process
covers steps 1-6 in the above protocol. Once a routing table
for the mesh is received (Step 6), the querying node contacts
each member of the target mesh network. Three messages are
sent per node: a key exchange message (step 7a), a range
query (step 7b), and a get/put query (step 7d or 7e). The total
number of hops is therefore O(log n) + O(3m). As shown
above, m ∈ O(log n), so routing remains in O(log n).
C. Security Analysis
In this section we discuss the security properties of the
Crypsis protocol. Since Crypsis is built over a structured over-
lay network, it inherits a number of properties (e.g. key-based
routing, Sybil attack vulnerabilities, etc.) which are relevant
to network security. With one exception, these concerns lie
outside the scope of our threat model and are not addressed
below. Note, however, that a significant amount of work has
been done in recent years on addressing these issues. Crypsis
is complementary to such work, and there is no reason why it
could not be implemented on a secured overlay. All theorems
presented in this section are proved in the appendix. Sketches
are given to provide insight into the intuition behind the proof.
Range Reporting The exception mentioned above forms a key
assumption that is necessary for Myrmic’s security guarantees
to hold:
Assumption 4.1: Nodes do not lie about the key range they
are responsible for.
Myrmic, described in Section IV-A3, implements a
certificate-based system that ensures the above assumption will
hold with high probability, given a limited number of colluding
adversaries and the prescence of a CA. We use this assumption
to prove a key claim:
Claim 4.1: Receiving a false mesh network routing table
will not leak any more information than is leaked in normal
protocol operation.
The proof, in Appendix A, is a case analysis of a querier’s
possible reactions given an arbitrary set of nodes in its routing
table. Nodes which do not host the querier’s target learn only
that they don’t host the key being looked up, and the node
(which would be present in the correct routing table) that
does host the querier’s target learns the key that the querier is
looking up.
Global Observer We first discuss Crypsis’ security versus
a passive global observer able to see all messages sent over
the network but not control any nodes. We use a standard
cryptographic game-based approach to analyse security. To do
this, we model the adversarial global observer’s interaction
with the Crypsis system (which for the purpose of this
particular security analysis, consists of only honest nodes) as
a game between an adversary and a challenger, as follows:
• A single challenger controls all nodes on the network.
• There is a nonempty set K which contains all keys in the
network
• There is a nonempty set S which contains all mesh
network identifiers
• There is a public function F : k ∈ K → s ∈ S
which maps all keys (for both nodes and items) to mesh
networks, such that each key is mapped to a single mesh
network.
• One conversation in the protocol (i.e. the interaction
between a querying node and all nodes in the target key’s
mesh network, as described in Section 4.2) is modelled
as a series of tuples of the form (seq, d,m) where:
1) seq is a sequence number which denotes all tuples
which are part of that conversation. The number of
tuples in one conversation is a function of F , and is
equal to the number of nodes mapped to the same
mesh network identifier as the target key.
2) d = F (k) represents the mesh network containing
the key being looked up. This corresponds to the
dummy key, kd used in protocol step 4. Since kd is
chosen independently of k subject to the constraint
that F (kd) = F (k), publishing the mesh network
id itself is an equivalent representation.
3) m = E(k, 0, get/put) represents the encrypted
request for a key k made in step 7d or 7e. Since
k is the only field which isn’t static, we use the
shorthand notation m = E(k).
All other protocol interactions are either local and do
not involve any interaction, do not contain information
relevant to recovery of the key being queried, or are
addressed separately below.
Given these assumptions, define the following game:
1) The adversary, A, chooses the following values and gives
them to the challenger:
a) A nonempty set K of keys.
b) A positive integer a, the transcript length.
2) The challenger generates a transcript T of length a and
gives it to the adversary. A transcript represents a series
of key lookups made over a Crypsis network. T is a
set of tuples of the form (seq, d,m) described above.
For each protocol iteration, the challenger draws a key
k ∈ K with probability 1|K| and sets d = F (k). The
number of tuples generated is equal to the number of
nodes which share the same mesh identifer as k. For
each tuple, m = E(k) iff the range of the node being
queried contains k, otherwise m = E(k′), where k′ ∈ K
is drawn uniformly at random from the range of the node
being queried.
3) The adversary chooses and outputs a key t ∈ K and
tuple w ∈ T s.t. A believes that wm = E(t) (i.e. the
tuple w contains an encrypted request m for the target
key t).
Definition 4.1: For the above game, we say a Crypsis
interaction is secure if a computationally bounded adversary
can correctly distinguish that for a chosen t ∈ K and m ∈ T ,
wm = E(t), with the following probability:
|P (Ac((wm = t) = t))− P (Ac((wm = ¬t) = t))| ≤ εc (3)
Theorem 4.1: If all components of step 7 in the Crypsis
query protocol use a semantically secure encryption scheme,
then the Crypsis protocol meets the security definition with
respect to a global observer.
We prove this theorem in the contrapositive in Appendix A,
using a reduction which shows that if there exists an adversary
Ac which can win the Crypsis game, then we can construct an
adversary Ae which can break semantically secure encryption.
Theorem 4.2: For n iterations of the above game, quantify
the number of correct adversarial outputs of the form (wm = t)
for a chosen target key t as X . Then X is subject to the
following upper Chernoff bound:




|M|∗3 and 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 (4)
We prove this in Appendix A by defining a binary indicator
variable which tracks adversarial successes, and showing that
it follows a binomial distribution.
Active Adversary An active adversary is one which both
has global observer capabilities, and controls some fraction
of nodes participating in the network. These nodes may
collude and deviate from protocol. We do not offer a for-
mal cryptographic security argument against this adversary.
Instead, we now discuss why the active adversary gains only
a small advantage over the passive observer. Namely, the active
adversary learns:
• The popularity (lookup frequency) of keys hosted by
adversarial nodes.
• The fact that a key being queried which is not hosted by
an adversarial node cannot be in the set of keys hosted
by adversarial nodes.
We use an exhaustive case analysis in Appendix A to argue
this claim. Ultimately, an adversary which does not deviate
from protocol gains complete information about the keys it
hosts. For those it does not host, it learns only that it does not
host them. An adversary which does deviate from protocol can
cause denial of service, but not gain any new information. See
the appendix for the complete argument.
D. Simulation
In order to confirm our analytical results, we simulated
Crypsis over a 1000-node Chord network with trace-driven
queries derived from [15]. This dataset contains traces of quote
activations over blogs hosted by blogspot during 2008. There
are 56888 unique quotes, each of which was mapped into a
160-bit keyspace.
Fig. 3. Actual key lookup frequencies
Using this data as a source of keys for get() queries, we set
the number of mesh networks, µ = 10/100/1000 and plotted
the observable key lookup frequencies from the perspective of
a passive global observer. The results are presented in Figures
4-6.
Fig. 4. Keyspace segmentation at µ = 10.
Fig. 5. Keyspace segmentation at µ = 100.
Observe that as the number of mesh networks increases, the
shape of the underlying distribution is revealed with higher
Fig. 6. Keyspace segmentation at µ = 1000.
and higher resolution. This demonstrates a tradeoff between
performance and security. Setting µ to a small value will
map a larger number of keys into each mesh network and
more thoroughly conceal which mesh networks have the most
(un)popular keys. However, this will also result in more nodes
being mapped to each mesh, and therefore increase the routing
and state overhead per node. Setting µ to a high value will have
the opposite effect. As discussed in Section IV-A2, we set µ to
be a function of population. This allows for the preservation
of logarithmic routing and state bounds.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Estimating Network Population
Accuracy Recall that the number of mesh networks, µ =
η
logη , where η is an estimate of the network population. η
can be efficiently computed using either active or passive
measurement techniques, as described in [13] and [14]. The
accuracy of these estimates is sufficiently fine grained, as our
only concern is keeping routing bounds and state within a
logarithmic amount of the actual population. Note that the
value of µ (and therefore the ranges assigned to each mesh
network) must be equal across all nodes in order to maintain
routing correctness, as otherwise mesh ranges may overlap.
However, due to dynamic network populations, it is impossible
to guarantee all nodes will independently arrive at the same
value of η, even in networks with no adversary. Clearly, some
protocol for agreeing on the value of η is needed.
Who Computes η? Using a single node to compute η raises
issues of trust and the possibility of a single point of failure.
If, for example, an adversary compromises the estimator, it
may arbitrarily set η and therefore µ. The adversary could
set µ to be so high that every node is isolated in its own
mesh, or report different values to different nodes and destroy
routing correctness. One alternative is a distributed agreement
protocol, ideally one resilient to Byzantine failures. Such
a protocol would allow nodes in the network to reach a
consensus on η without a central authority. However, these
protocols add a nontrivial amount of complexity and overhead.
We propose a different solution. Crypsis already uses Myrmic
to provide root verification. Its Neighborhood Authorities form
a stateless, trusted network which does not participate in
normal routing. Neighborhood Authorities are ideally suited
to compute and distribute a common value for µ. Distribution
may be either via piggybacking on normal messages, or by
inserting signed updates into the existing structured overlay at
a well-known location. If another root verification system is
being used which does not employ online, trusted nodes, the
CA can perform a similar role or instantiate a trusted set of
stateless nodes to do so.
Updates Despite the fact that network populations are dy-
namic, updates to η must be infrequent, as changing the value
of µ prompts a reconfiguration of all mesh networks. At
first this seems like a significant design flaw, but there are
mitigating factors:
• The coarse granularity of η allows updates to µ to be
made on the order of hours or days in the steady-state
case.
• The value of µ has no effect routing correctness; only on
performance. This allows updates to be delayed in times
of high network traffic or periods of heavy node churn
(e.g. flash crowds).
B. Practical Considerations
We have, so far, considered the problem of popularity-
revealing attacks and proposed a system using one-way ag-
gregation to bound the information on key lookup frequency
which can be leaked by the network. Some discussion of
the practical implications of this bound may be necessary.
Specifically, we would like to address the question of what
can be done with observations of aggregate popularity. This
is a necessarily informal treatment, as an adversary’s ultimate
objectives (e.g. denial of service, censorship, prosecution of
participants) and strategy may vary.
Relative Popularity Consider the example of an adversary
which has a prior distribution such that a particular key is
expected to be extremely popular (e.g. a key that maps to a
popular leaked document or pirated blockbuster).
Upon joining and monitoring a Crypsis network, that ad-
versary can determine how popular the keyspace segment
containing that key is relative to all other segments. If the
relative popularity is low, the adversary may conclude that
the item is not present in the network at all, or that its
existence in the network is not a well-known fact, etc., and
adjust its posterior distribution accordingly. A high relative
popularity, conversely, may do little to alter the adversary’s
expectations. The segment is popular, which may indicate
the key in question is popular, or that a number of keys are
moderately popular, etc. The adversary may draw any number
of conclusions.
In other words, high relative popularity of a keyspace
segment does not constitute sufficient evidence that the item
itself is popular; only that the keyspace segment containing
that item is popular.
Deniable Popularity Essentially, Crypsis leaks information
about the distribution of lookup requests (e.g. shape) while
concealing enough information on individual key lookup fre-
quencies to provide a kind of plausible deniability with respect
to popularity. This feature is useful in contexts where a penalty
for providing access to an item of content is tied to the number
of accesses made to that item, e.g. damages for copyright
infringement.
VI. RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no published
research on concealing key lookup frequencies in structured
overlay networks. Related work can be divided into two
categories: the evidence of content following power law distri-
butions which motivated our work, and research on anonymous
communication over structured overlay networks that is similar
to our work.
A. Power-Law Popularity
A large body of work has been published on the power-
law distribution of Internet services. Breslau et al. found that
the distribution of web page requests to web caches follows
a Zipf-like rule [2]. Jung et al. find a similar heavy-tailed
distribution to be present for DNS resolution queries [12].
Ripeanu et al. analyze the Gnutella network and conclude that
its topology also follows a power law-like distribution [23].
Beehive [21], a fast lookup service for structured overlays,
is designed around power-law query distributions. Due to the
sheer number of services which follow power laws, in addition
to the specific applicability of Beehive, DNS queries, and
file sharing to structured overlays, we feel that exposure of
the few dominating keys constitutes a significant adversarial
advantage. By concentrating attacks on these keys only, an
adversary can dramatically amplify the ratio of damage caused
per resources spent.
B. Anonymous Structured Overlays
There has been a significant amount of work on anonymity
in sturctured overlay networks. Borisov [1] and Mislove et al.
[18] demonstrated that complete origin anonymity is possible
in Chord and other DHTs via random walks and probabilistic
forwarding, respectively. [1] also concludes that complete
destination anonymity is impossible without sacrificing the
routing guarantees provided by structured overlay networks.
Various attempts have been made to address the problem
of destination anonymity, which is related to the problem of
concealing key lookup frequencies. (Since content and nodes
share the same address space, knowing the destination of a
message exposes information about the key being looked up,
and vice versa.) We stress that the problems are not equivalent,
however, as destination anonymity does not necessarily require
the key being looked up to be hidden; only the node responsi-
ble for that key. Similarly, strong concealment of key lookup
frequencies may still leak information on the destination of a
message.
Salsa [19] divides the keyspace into a contiguous series
of smaller circular keyspaces using namespace partitioning.
Nodes employ redundant lookups and a variant of random
circuits to provide mutual anonymity for networks with fewer
than 20% of their population under adversarial control.
SurePath [27] performs a variant of onion routing over a
DHT to provide both origin and destination anonymity. It
uses the concept of relay set anchors, which are DHT nodes
chosen by hashing a node identifier, secret key, and current
time. These nodes are used to onion route a message from
origin to destination, relying on both the origin and destination
plausibly being onion routers and not endpoints.
Torsk [17], designed as a distributed replacement to the
Tor directory service, also uses a variant of onion routing
combined with cover traffic and root verification (see Section
4) to implement a form of origin anonymity. The system is
primarily designed to locate a series of onion routers for tunnel
construction in an anonymous fashion, and is not concerned
with hiding the content of lookups; only their origin.
Nisan [20] is a modified Chord-like system designed to
be resilient to many common attacks on structured overlay
networks. It uses an iterative, aggregated search function to
provide redundant lookup capabilities. Nisan hides the value
of an aggregate search query by asking intermediate nodes for
their entire routing table, rather than the entry closest to the
queried ID. Bounds checking is used for each returned routing
table, in order to prevent malicious nodes from responding
with false route information. Note that, while Nisan hides
query values from intermediate nodes, this does not conceal
key lookup frequency from a weak global adversary. Such an
adversary would be aware that the sequence of nodes being
queried converges on a single node.
Cashmere [28] applies the principle of Chaum-Mixes to
DHTs. It divides nodes in a structured overlay into sets, and
treats each set as one relay point in a routing path. The
destination may be in any of the sets present on the path, and
onion encryption is used to ensure the relay groups cannot
infer previous or future hops.
Agyaat [24] is architecturally similar to Crypsis, but differs
in both intent and a few key design choices. It uses random
meshes (’clouds’) of nodes to conceal origin and destination.
Lookups are mapped to cloud identifiers, and the query is
flooded to all members of the cloud. The query itself is not
concealed, and the threat model being considered uses an
adversary attempting to discover the originating or termination
node for a query; no consideration is given to the query itself.
Herbivore [10] uses a similar approach, leveraging a global
DHT backbone for communication between clusters of nodes.
In this work, however, each cluster is a dining cryptographer
network organized into a star topology. Herbivore provides k-
anonymity, with k being the size of an individual’s cluster. Key
lookup frequency is not concealed in Herbivore, and indeed
cannot be given the local network protocol that the system
relies on.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have defined the Zenith attack, a class of attack which
reveals the popularity of content in a structured overlay
network. We launched a Zenith attack against the Chord
and Kademlia protocols, and found that the cost of doing
so is extremely low. To mitigate the impact of this attack
we proposed, analyzed, and evaluated Crypsis, a popularity
concealment protocol that implements one-way aggregation
of queries over segments of the keyspace, while maintaining
logarithmic routing and state bounds. Crypsis uses a structured
overlay as a backbone connecting complete mesh networks,
each of which is responsible for a segment of the total
keyspace. A special query protocol which conceals query type
and destination is used to limit popularity-related information
to data on the keyspace segment containing a target key.
Given recent high-profile leaks of sensitive information, as
well as ongoing debates related to file sharing and network
neutrality, the need for a sense of plausible deniability with
respect to content popularity seems clear. Since no prior
work has been done on popularity concealment, we hope that
Crypsis will serve as a motivation to explore this aspect of
network security in both structured and unstructured overlays.
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APPENDIX
Claim A.1: Recieving a false mesh network routing table
will not leak any more information than is leaked in normal
protocol operation.
Proof: By protocol step 7b, the querier must recieve the
range of the node being queried before sending any key-
related information. By Assumption 1, this range is truthfully
reported. If the querier recieves a list of adversarially chosen
nodes, each node will be either adversarial or benign:
• If adversarial, and it does not contain the target key, then
by protocol step 7e, the querier will request a dummy
key uniformly at random from within that node’s range.
The adversary can revise the set of keys which contains
k to not include those keys which fall within the range
hosted by that node. However, it could do this via normal
operation as well.
• If an adversarial, and it does contain the target key, then
the adversary learns k. However, this would occur during
normal protocol operation.
• If benign, then by Theorem A.1, the adversary cannot
distinguish a masking query from a genuine query.
In any of the above cases, the protocol will terminate once the
entire list of nodes has been queried.
Theorem A.1: If all components of step 7 in the Crypsis
query protocol use a semantically secure encryption scheme,
then the Crypsis protocol meets the security definition with
respect to a global observer.
Proof: We prove the above claim via a reduction to
encryption. Assume that the thesis is false, and a Crypsis
adversary can succeed in distinguishing messages with a
non-negligible probability. Formally, assume there exists an
algorithm Ac such that:
|P (Ac((m.w = t) = t))− P (Ac((m.w = ¬t) = t))| > εc
(5)
Then we can define an algorithm Ae which uses Ac to suc-
ceed in distinguishing semantically secure messages. Consider
the following game:
1) Ac chooses the set K and transcript length a, and outputs
them to Ae.
2) Ae generates a transcript using the following procedure:
a) Draw a key from k with uniform probability.
b) Ask the encryption oracle to encrypt (k, 0, get).
c) Generate the tuple (seq, d,m). Set m =
E(k, 0, get).
d) Add the tuple to T .
e) Repeat steps 1-4 until |T | = a− 1.
f) Draw two keys m0,m1 and submit both to the
encryption oracle with the above concatenation.
g) Insert the returned c∗ into T at a uniformly random
position.
3) Give T to Ac.
4) Ac outputs the tuple (t, w, b). If w 6= c∗ or t /∈
{m0,m1}, abort Ae.
5) Otherwise:
• If (t = m0) guess c∗ = m0
• If (t = m1) guess c∗ = m1
Note that Ac is useful only if the advantage it contributes
is non-negligible. Since Ae effectively simulates Ac:
w = P (Ac(m.w = t) = t) ∩ABORT )
x = P (Ae(Enc(t)) = t)
w = x
y = P (Ac(m.w = t̄) = t) ∩ABORT )
z = P (Ae(Enc(t̄)) = t)
y = z
Then it follows that:
|w − y| = |x− z| (6)
As described above, an abort occurs when Ac does not
output both c∗ and either m0 or m1. Since c∗ is inserted
into the transcript uniformly at random and m0,m1 are drawn
from K with probability 1|K| , respectively, the probability
of aborting is independent of c∗,m0, and m1. Therefore
P (m = c∗) = 1/|T | and P (t ∈ {m0,m1}) = 2/|K|. So not
aborting happens with the probability P (ABORT ) = 2|T ||K| .
Then we can rewrite |w − y| as:
P (ABORT )|P (Ac(m.w = t) = t)− P (Ac(m.w = t̄) = t)|
(7)
By definition of Ac’s win condition, |P (Ac(m.w = t) = t)−
P (Ac(m.w = t̄) = t)| > εc. Then substituting into the above
relations, it follows that:
|x− z| > P (ABORT ) ∗ εc (8)
Therefore the advantage gained by simulating Ac is non-
negligible.
Theorem A.2: For n iterations of the security game, quan-
tify the number of correct adversarial outputs of the form
(m.w = t) for a chosen target key t as X . Then X is subject
to the following upper Chernoff bound:




|M|∗3 and 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 (9)
Proof: Assume that n iterations of the game take place.
For each iteration, define an indicator variable xi, where 0 ≤
i ≤ n. Set xi as follows:
xi =
{







Then X is equal to the number of correct guesses made by
the adversary. By Theorem 1.1, X is the sum of independent
Bernoulli trials conducted with a coin biased by at most
1
|M | + ε. This satisfies the requirement for establishment of a
Chernoff bound. The quantity n|M | is, by Eqn 1, the expectation
on X .
Claim A.2: An active adversary gains only limited informa-
tion
First assume the adversarial nodes do not deviate from pro-
tocol. Then with respect to a particular key k, any adversarial
node A will fall into one of two categories:
• F (A) 6= F (k): The adversarial node is in a different mesh
network, and does not participate in any secure protocol
iterations for k (i.e protocol step 7). It learns only the
dummy key being used to route to the mesh network
hosting k.
• F (A) = F (k): If A is the host of k, the adversary will
learn k. If the hash function used to assign IDs to nodes
and items is secure (i.e. acts like a random oracle) and
uniformly maps pre-images to its domain, then P(A hosts
k) = 1|N | , where N is the set of all nodes in the network.
If A is not the host of k, then the adversary can revise the
set M to exclude those keys which the node does host.
If adversarial nodes do deviate from protocol, then there are
four places in to protocol where they may do so:
• Step 4: An adversarial node may re-route or drop mes-
sages on the overlay. These messages contain only F(k),
however, which is not secret information.
• Step 6: This step is addressed in the section on range
reporting.
• Step 7c: By Assumption 1, the adversary cannot report
false information on this step.
• Step7f: An adversarial node may falsifiy the value of a
key that it hosts. This may amount to denial of service,
but does not compromise our security properties. Con-
sider: the value is either meaningless (if responding to
a dummy key request) or is the value associated with
k, which is the case only if the adversary hosts k and
trivially knows the popularity of k.
